Is Abortion Right?
To murder, as we definitely know, is seriously wrong, but to abort with some exact reasons is allowed. Actually, we have known that to kill, in fact in some conditions or contexts, is not wrong, because there is always an exception or an excuse to do what we are truly prohibited to do. That is a sort of exceptional condition in which we can in dilemma position scarcely deny doing whatsoever is wrong.
I think we need another approach to understanding whether abortion is right in order to evaluate our firm standpoint which we often believe dogmatically. It is seriously not enough to solely count on the reproductive rights in which each woman has determine what will be or must be happening to her body. There is still one slipped risk which we forget to consider in it.
Phenomenologically, human being experiences her or himself not by her or himself, but by in fact the existence of others. Absolutely, being an unwanted child is exceedingly deleterious tragedy in itself on the grounds that growing up without our parents is a big loss, because the parents, by which and only by which we can identify ourselves, are irreplaceable. We find it absurd to exchange our kinship with a being not our kin(d). To internalise our existential being has to be grounded in externalising our identity by seeking out our kinship by which and with which we can merely identify ourselves.
Well, what is happening if a woman aborts her baby irrespective of any of her reason? It is undeniable that there will be not only a grand mistake viewed by purely moral conscience — regardless of fetuses not being “person” — but also a deleterious existence in our judgment that will always haunt us because of having done it. Actually, we have always identified ourselves with what kinship we are, so we can only encounter ourselves authentically by externalising our kind to be a authentic being. In abortion case, instead of externalising our kind, we kill a being with which we can identify ourselves, a definite being making us enough to be aware of who we are and from whom fetuses are.
Absolutely, we can hardly encounter existential crises which truly shake our letzbegrundung, except that we find our parents or children no longer live. Certainly, in other kinships, we can still feel sad or pitiful but in a context of mourning, no more. While, in our kinship, by reason of having grounded ourselves on the likeness of our existential code, we must feel sorrowful and distressed because we will not be able to identify our kinship with who has no longer been alive.
A fertilised egg is, in fact, not a person, at least is not the same senses as the adults are, but we cannot neglect that it has been a definite being that has had likeness with “the parents”. In a fertilised egg, two persons have embodied their trace of not only biological DNA, but their existential code also — tendencies, traits, behaviour — in it. It is unavoidable that the status of “personhood” which is owned by “the parents” has been potential for it, and a definite being that has received “its subjectivity” in her womb, in fact phenomenologically, has been able to be touched by her emotional core and psychical feeling in her depth.
We cannot justify a thing merely by the perspective of right — making us appear not to have deep feeling in viewing interior facet we will feel in the upcoming time. It is enough indication to unveil a phenomenological mistake for them to feel “diminished” because of having murdered deliberately irrespective of whatsoever those reasons they decide are. Their integrity as full beings becomes diminished, with the result that obviously they might existentially experience an identity fragmentation, demoralisation, depersonalisation, and progressive estrangement. Consequently, while I do not want to make this more rigid to dribble your own standpoint, we have at least unravel why the question in this article is worthy interposing to insinuate and intrude your dogmatic-looking viewpoint.[]